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Executive Registry



FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 3508 Market Street, Science Center Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104 (215) EV 2-0685

William R. Kintner President Alan Ned Sabrosky Director

February 5, 1982

Dear Bill:

As you know, for many years I have been involved in the work of the U.S. intelligence community, even including some years with the Agency. A concern that I have carried with me for a long time is the vulnerability of good intelligence estimates to certain human frailties, most particularly the problem we all sometimes have approaching new issues with habitual insights.

We have made progress over the years and we have learned from our mistakes, but we still have a long way to go in overcoming intellectual complacency. On the road ahead, I am convinced that research institutions outside of government could play an important supplementary role in opening our eyes to a wider range of interpretations of a given development.

For that reason, I want to bring the enclosed concept paper to your attention. It points out the special utility of external input into the intelligence process, noting that outside analysts are not entrenched in "schools" of thought associated with particular positions inside the Agency. Moreover, those outside the Agency can better afford to make strikingly novel interpretations when warranted by the evidence because their jobs and reputations do not depend as heavily on being the perfect prophet. Excessive caution is sometimes the enemy of truth.

If you agree that this proposal merits serious consideration, I would be happy to come talk it over with you at your convenience.

Wishing you the very best, I remain,

Respectfully,

William R. Kintner

The Honorable William H. Casey Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505

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